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Effect of Reluctant Players in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma Game
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4645
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/46454ca90b64-3286-4aa9-8ac3-fadf44a72904
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
RevisedEffectOfReluctantPlayersInDemographicPrisoner'sDilemmaGameForBarrel.pdf (210.0 kB)
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| Item type | 会議発表論文 / Conference Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2011-10-03 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Effect of Reluctant Players in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma Game | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Prisoner's Dilemma game | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | emergence of cooperation | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | generalized reciprocity | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Agent-Based Simulation | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | conference paper | |||||
| 著者 |
Namekata, Tsuneyuki
× Namekata, Tsuneyuki× Namekata, Yoko |
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| bibliographic_information |
en : Proceedings of the 14th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making under Uncertainty p. 102-109, 発行日 2011 |
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| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 417 | |||||
| NIIサブジェクト | ||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 数学 | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | We consider the effect of reluctant player on emergence of cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game. Players are initially randomly distributed in square lattice of cells. In each period, players move to random cell in von Neumann neighbors if unoccupied and play PD game against neighboring player. If wealth (accumulated payoff) of player becomes negative or his age becomes greater than his lifetime, he dies. If his wealth becomes greater than some amount and there is an unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. We introduce global move, global play, and reluctant players who use extended forms of Tit for Tat. TFT uses Cooperate (C) at the first period and thereafter immediately replies with the same move to the opponent's. Unlike TFT, a reluctant player may start with Defect (D) at the first period and delay replying with the opponent's move in the last play to an opponent in the current play. Some types of reluctant players are considered by extent of delay. We investigate, by Agent-Based Simulation, the emergence of cooperation where there are reluctant players as well as AllC's and AllD's, and show some cases where cooperation is emerged more frequently with reluctant players than without them. | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| item_3_description_20 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | 14th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making under Uncertainty | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| item_3_description_21 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | Hejnice, Czech Republic | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| item_3_description_22 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | September 18-21, 2011 | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
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Cite as
Namekata, Tsuneyuki, Namekata, Yoko, 2011, Effect of Reluctant Players in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma Game: 102–109 p.
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