@inproceedings{oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004049,
 author = {Namekata, Tsuneyuki and Namekata, Yoko},
 book = {Proceedings of the 14th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making under Uncertainty},
 month = {},
 note = {We consider the effect of reluctant player on emergence of cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game. Players are initially randomly distributed in square lattice of cells. In each period, players move to random cell in von Neumann neighbors if unoccupied and play PD game against neighboring player. If wealth (accumulated payoff) of player becomes negative or his age becomes greater than his lifetime, he dies. If his wealth becomes greater than some amount and there is an unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. We introduce global move, global play, and reluctant players who use extended forms of Tit for Tat. TFT uses Cooperate (C) at the first period and thereafter immediately replies with the same move to the opponent's. Unlike TFT, a reluctant player may start with Defect (D) at the first period and delay replying with the opponent's move in the last play to an opponent in the current play. Some types of reluctant players are considered by extent of delay. We investigate, by Agent-Based Simulation, the emergence of cooperation where there are reluctant players as well as AllC's and AllD's, and show some cases where cooperation is emerged more frequently with reluctant players than without them., 14th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making under Uncertainty, Hejnice, Czech Republic, September 18-21, 2011},
 pages = {102--109},
 title = {Effect of Reluctant Players in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma Game},
 year = {2011}
}