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Emergence of cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game : tags and connections

http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4359
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4359
8e5fa17f-6be2-4437-8414-cc0c4265c17a
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
EmergenceOfCooperation.pdf EmergenceOfCooperation.pdf (832.4 kB)
Item type 会議発表論文 / Conference Paper(1)
公開日 2010-11-17
タイトル
タイトル Emergence of cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game : tags and connections
言語 en
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 Prisoner's Dilemma game
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 emergence of cooperation
キーワード
言語 en
主題Scheme Other
主題 Agent-Based Simulation
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
資源タイプ conference paper
著者 Namekata, Tsuneyuki

× Namekata, Tsuneyuki

WEKO 8123

en Namekata, Tsuneyuki

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Namekata, Yoko

× Namekata, Yoko

WEKO 8124

en Namekata, Yoko

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bibliographic_information en : Proceedings of the 13th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making in Service Science

p. 149-154, 発行日 2010
出版タイプ
出版タイプ AM
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
日本十進分類法
言語 ja
主題Scheme NDC
主題 417
NIIサブジェクト
言語 ja
主題Scheme Other
主題 数学
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 We extend Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game introduced by Epstein. He shows emergence of cooperation where Cooperator and Defector are initially randomly distributed in a square lattice of cells. In each period, players move to random cell in von Neumann neighbors if unoccupied and play PD game against neighboring player. If wealth (accumulated payoff) of player becomes negative or his age becomes greater than the lifetime, he dies. If his wealth becomes greater than some threshold and there is unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. We introduce global movement, global interaction, and player (we call Referential) who uses tag-based Tit for Tat. We also introduce connections of player which is a list of limited number of recent opponents against whom the player used C and each opponent also used C at the same time. Referential uses C against the opponent in his connections when they meet again. We consider the case where a player can take one unit of wealth from every living member in his connections if his wealth becomes negative. We show, by using Agent-Based Simulation, the parameter settings where cooperation emerges in some frequency between Referential and Defector, while it is almost impossible between Cooperator and Defector.
言語 en
item_3_description_20
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 13th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making in Service Science
言語 en
item_3_description_21
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Otaru, Japan
言語 en
item_3_description_22
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Nov. 3-5, 2010
言語 en
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