@inproceedings{oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003790,
 author = {Namekata, Tsuneyuki and Namekata, Yoko},
 book = {Proceedings of the 13th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making in Service Science},
 month = {},
 note = {We extend Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game introduced by Epstein. He shows emergence of cooperation where Cooperator and Defector are initially randomly distributed in a square lattice of cells. In each period, players move to random cell in von Neumann neighbors if unoccupied and play PD game against neighboring player. If wealth (accumulated payoff) of player becomes negative or his age becomes greater than the lifetime, he dies. If his wealth becomes greater than some threshold and there is unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. We introduce global movement, global interaction, and player (we call Referential) who uses tag-based Tit for Tat. We also introduce connections of player which is a list of limited number of recent opponents against whom the player used C and each opponent also used C at the same time. Referential uses C against the opponent in his connections when they meet again. We consider the case where a player can take one unit of wealth from every living member in his connections if his wealth becomes negative. We show, by using Agent-Based Simulation, the parameter settings where cooperation emerges in some frequency between Referential and Defector, while it is almost impossible between Cooperator and Defector., 13th Czech-Japan Seminar on Data Analysis and Decision Making in Service Science, Otaru, Japan, Nov. 3-5, 2010},
 pages = {149--154},
 title = {Emergence of cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game : tags and connections},
 year = {2010}
}