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アイテム
Effect of Variable-Threshold Strategies in Demographic Donor-Recipient and Prisoner's Dilemma Games
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4934
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/493422752162-b33a-4e20-b110-8cb55dd466aa
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
EffectOfVariable-ThresholdStrategiesInDemographicDonor-RecipientAndPrisoner'sDilemmaGames201207ForBarrel.pdf (622.4 kB)
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| Item type | 会議発表論文 / Conference Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2012-08-06 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Effect of Variable-Threshold Strategies in Demographic Donor-Recipient and Prisoner's Dilemma Games | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Donor-Recipient game | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Prisoner's Dilemma game | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | emergence of cooperation | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | generalized reciprocity | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Agent-Based Simulation | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | conference paper | |||||
| 著者 |
Namekata, Tsuneyuki
× Namekata, Tsuneyuki× Namekata, Yoko |
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| 書誌情報 | p. 1-18, 発行日 2012-07 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | RC33 | |||||
| テキストバージョン | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | AM | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 417 | |||||
| NIIサブジェクト | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 数学 | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | We consider effect of variable-threshold strategies on emergence of cooperation in demographic dilemma game, Donor-Recipient or Prisoner's Dilemma game. Tit for Tat changes his move at each period depending on the previous opponent’s move. In real life, people further change their tendency toward cooperation or defection. We want to incorporate this change into our model. We introduce variable-threshold strategies whose components are extended forms of TFT. We interpret that TFT uses Defect if the state is 0, Cooperate if it is 1 and the smallest state number that prescribes using Cooperate as a threshold. AllC has zero threshold in this interpretation. We allow up to three states. Variable-threshold strategy changes its threshold at most once at some age (once in his lifetime) depending on its experience until then. Thus variable-threshold TFT who was born as TFT may change to AllC or AllD. Also variable-threshold AllC who was born as AllC may change to TFT. Players are initially randomly distributed in square lattice of cells. In each period, players move locally to random cell in von Neumann neighbors if unoccupied or globally to random unoccupied cell in the whole lattice, and play dilemma game against local neighboring player or against randomly selected player from the whole lattice. If wealth (accumulated payoff) of player becomes negative or his age becomes greater than his lifetime, he dies. If his wealth becomes greater than some amount and there is unoccupied cell in neighbors, he has an offspring. A stage game is Donor-Recipient or Prisoner's Dilemma game. Donor-Recipient game is a two-person game where one player is randomly selected as Donor and the other as Recipient. Donor has two moves, Cooperate and Defect. Cooperate means Donor pays cost c in order for Recipient to receive benefit b (b>c>0). Defect means Donor does nothing. Note that Recipient has no move. Prisoner's Dilemma game which we use here is a two-person simultaneous move game where both players have two moves, Cooperate and Defect, whose meanings are the same as in Donor-Recipient game. For convenience sake we shift the original payoffs in order for the new payoffs of player to be positive if the opponent uses Cooperate and negative if Defect. We investigate, by Agent-Based Simulation, emergence of cooperation where there are variable-threshold strategies and the difference between Donor-Recipient and Prisoner's Dilemma game, and show some cases where cooperation emerges more frequently with variable-threshold strategies than without them. | |||||
| 会議名 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | RC33 8th International Conference on Social Science Methodology | |||||
| 会議開催地 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | The University of Sydney - Sydney, Australia | |||||
| 会議開催日 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | Monday 9th - Friday 13th July 2012 | |||||
