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Collusion Deterrence Mechanisms in Hierarchical Regulatory Contracts
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4312
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4312e24186d4-d411-4719-9f3d-f57fa9b9d8e3
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
Econ. j. of Hokkaido Univ.26_115-131.pdf (852.4 kB)
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| Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2010-09-30 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Collusion Deterrence Mechanisms in Hierarchical Regulatory Contracts | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
| 著者 |
SANO, Hiroyuki
× SANO, Hiroyuki |
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| 著者別名 | ||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
| 識別子 | 8023 | |||||
| 姓名 | Sano, Hiroyuki | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| bibliographic_information |
en : Economic journal of Hokkaido University 巻 26, p. 115-131, 発行日 1997 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Faculty of Economics, Hokkaido University | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| ISSN / EISSN | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | 0916-4650 | |||||
| item_1_source_id_11 | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA10772967 | |||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 330 | |||||
| NIIサブジェクト | ||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 経済学 | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper studies regulatory contracts in a three-tier hierarchical structure of a principal, a monopoly firm which has private information, and a supervisor who is employed by the principal to bridge the informational gap between the principal and the firm. If the supervisor is self-interested, then collusion between the firm and the supervisor is possible. This paper derives a collusion-deterrence mechanism which attains the same welfare result as the collusion-free contract, even when collusion is possible. The timing of the supervisor's audit of the firm is found to play a crucial role in this mechanism. | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
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Cite as
SANO, Hiroyuki, 1997, Collusion Deterrence Mechanisms in Hierarchical Regulatory Contracts: Faculty of Economics, Hokkaido University, 115–131 p.
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