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The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4255
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/42554da4d61e-4d78-40b8-9caa-41b23afebe9d
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
DP_68.PDF (1.1 MB)
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| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2010-07-08 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| 著者 |
Shinotsuka, Tomoichi
× Shinotsuka, Tomoichi× Takamiya, Koji |
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| 著者別名 | ||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
| 識別子 | 7875 | |||||
| 姓名 | 篠塚, 友一 | |||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 著者別名 | ||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||
| 識別子 | 7876 | |||||
| 姓名 | 高宮, 浩司 | |||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| bibliographic_information |
en : Discussion paper series 巻 68, p. 1-22, 発行日 2001-01 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター | |||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 331.19 | |||||
| NIIサブジェクト | ||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 経済学 | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are supposed to be "absolutely powerful" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms, Exclusion and Strong Non-Discrimination. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, can have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power, We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
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Cite as
Shinotsuka, Tomoichi, Takamiya, Koji, 2001, The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター, 1–22 p.
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