{"created":"2023-05-15T15:31:32.114883+00:00","id":4257,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"b322efc3-3018-4185-870a-5c3c03b1d0c8"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"4257","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"4257"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004257","sets":["1:314"]},"author_link":["9206","9207"],"item_1_biblio_info_5":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2012","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"1","bibliographicPageEnd":"21","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"41","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"International Journal of Game Theory"}]}]},"item_1_description_18":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper studies howamatching rule affects the evolution of fairness in the ultimatumgame. Gale et al. [1995] show that under the randommatching rule, a partially fair imperfect Nash equilibrium in which all proposers are fair but some responders are selfish is asymptotically stable in the limit as noise in learning vanishes if responders are noisier than proposers.This paper shows that, under an assortative matching rule, a mutually fair imperfect Nash equilibrium in which all proposers are fair and all responders are reciprocal is limit asymptotically stable as noise due to committed agents vanishes.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_1_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"9207","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"白田, 康洋"}]}]},"item_1_publisher_6":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Springer-Verlag"}]},"item_1_relation_8":{"attribute_name":"DOI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"isVersionOf","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"info:doi/10.1007/s00182-011-0271-0","subitem_relation_type_select":"DOI"}}]},"item_1_rights_12":{"attribute_name":"権利表記","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com."}]},"item_1_rights_13":{"attribute_name":"出版社版URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"http://www.springerlink.com/content/l0511718j1w1g2g0/"}]},"item_1_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"書誌ID（NCID）","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA00228660","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_1_source_id_7":{"attribute_name":"ISSN / EISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"0020-7276","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_1_subject_16":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"331","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_1_subject_17":{"attribute_name":"NIIサブジェクト","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Assortative matching","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Evolutionary game","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Fairness","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Ultimatum game","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_1_version_type_15":{"attribute_name":"テキストバージョン","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Shirata, Yasuhiro"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-01-26"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"IntJGameTheory41(1)_1-21.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"451.2 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"IntJGameTheory41(1)_1-21.pdf","url":"https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/4257/files/IntJGameTheory41(1)_1-21.pdf"},"version_id":"051aac2d-1d43-4ca4-8e72-3242b38bb64e"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"journal article","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game"}]},"item_type_id":"1","owner":"3","path":["4","314"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2012-05-21"},"publish_date":"2012-05-21","publish_status":"0","recid":"4257","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":3},"updated":"2023-07-20T08:00:19.091173+00:00"}