{"created":"2023-05-15T15:31:30.546771+00:00","id":4221,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"b189320c-9dc4-4545-9c63-4f94a9e5bc0b"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"4221","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"4221"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004221","sets":["1:479"]},"author_link":["9111","9110"],"item_1_biblio_info_5":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2009-09","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"3","bibliographicPageEnd":"383","bibliographicPageStart":"365","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"165","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics"}]}]},"item_1_description_18":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper investigates a long-run equilibrium of the Tullock contest using an evolutionary game-theoretic approach. The finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) yields overdissipation of rent when there are increasing returns to expenditure. However, imitative behavior, considered to be a source of the evolutionary dynamics behind the ESS, is implausible because individual rationality is not always satisfied. In this paper, we attempt to specify such implicit imitative behavior and construct explicit evolutionary dynamics. Under our plausible imitation rule, we show that full dissipation may prevail in the long run as long as there are increasing returns.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_1_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"9111","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"佐野, 博之"}]}]},"item_1_publisher_6":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Mohr Siebeck"}]},"item_1_relation_8":{"attribute_name":"DOI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"isVersionOf","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"info:doi/10.1628/093245609789472014","subitem_relation_type_select":"DOI"}}]},"item_1_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"書誌ID（NCID）","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA10707397","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_1_source_id_7":{"attribute_name":"ISSN / EISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"0932-4569","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_1_subject_16":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"331","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_1_subject_17":{"attribute_name":"NIIサブジェクト","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"経済学","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_1_version_type_15":{"attribute_name":"テキストバージョン","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Sano, Hiroyuki"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"9110","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-01-26"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"imitation_in_contests_revised.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"223.8 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"imitation_in_contests_revised.pdf","url":"https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/4221/files/imitation_in_contests_revised.pdf"},"version_id":"605205a2-7305-442f-b0c7-8da8f5893473"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Contests","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Overdissipation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Imitative learning","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Stochastically stable state","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"journal article","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Imitative learning in Tullock contests: Does overdissipation prevail in the long run?","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Imitative learning in Tullock contests: Does overdissipation prevail in the long run?"}]},"item_type_id":"1","owner":"3","path":["4","479"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2012-04-23"},"publish_date":"2012-04-23","publish_status":"0","recid":"4221","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Imitative learning in Tullock contests: Does overdissipation prevail in the long run?"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":3},"updated":"2023-07-20T08:06:27.910024+00:00"}