{"created":"2023-05-15T15:31:06.674672+00:00","id":3689,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"0abb2b7f-2f2f-438f-8c9e-34a1403e2f9f"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"3689","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"3689"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003689","sets":[]},"author_link":["7862","7864","7865","7863"],"item_8_biblio_info_4":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2001-10","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"18","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"74","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series"}]}]},"item_8_description_20":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are \"absolutely powerful\" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power. We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination, and Exclusion.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"7864","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"篠塚, 友一"}]},{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"7865","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"高宮, 浩司"}]}]},"item_8_publisher_5":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター"}]},"item_8_subject_18":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"331.19","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_subject_19":{"attribute_name":"NIIサブジェクト","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"経済学","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_8_version_type_17":{"attribute_name":"テキストバージョン","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Shinotsuka, Tomoichi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Takamiya, Koji"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-01-26"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"DP_74.PDF","filesize":[{"value":"961.7 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"DP_74.PDF","url":"https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/3689/files/DP_74.PDF"},"version_id":"8875a929-aa4d-486a-a0ec-3ac359cd43ce"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"3","path":["145"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2010-07-12"},"publish_date":"2010-07-12","publish_status":"0","recid":"3689","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":3},"updated":"2023-07-20T08:28:32.599234+00:00"}