{"created":"2023-05-15T15:31:02.839969+00:00","id":3611,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"ef4fdbed-f6a9-4340-b35d-9d914755aec1"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"3611","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"3611"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003611","sets":[]},"author_link":["7675"],"item_8_biblio_info_4":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2012-02","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"23","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"145","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Discussion paper series"}]}]},"item_8_description_12":{"attribute_name":"内容記述","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本文ファイルを差し替え（2012年11月12日）","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_8_description_20":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"We consider a game with \" meta-players\" who observe each other's actions before actual play. The observability exerts an effect like repeated games without discounting. The game has Nash equilibria with any individually rational payoff profiles. In addition, the outcomes that satisfy a modified version of evolutionary stability lead to Pareto efficiency in coordination games.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_8_publisher_5":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター"}]},"item_8_subject_18":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"331","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_8_subject_19":{"attribute_name":"NIIサブジェクト","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"経済学","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_8_version_type_17":{"attribute_name":"テキストバージョン","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Ishii, Ryosuke"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-01-26"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"ObservableActions12.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"132.5 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"ObservableActions12.pdf","url":"https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/3611/files/ObservableActions12.pdf"},"version_id":"222e6e9e-8389-4ea7-aad0-a53b84aa95a0"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Metagame","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Folk theorem","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Evolutionarily stable set","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Equilibrium selection","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Observable Actions","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Observable Actions"}]},"item_type_id":"8","owner":"3","path":["145"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2012-03-05"},"publish_date":"2012-03-05","publish_status":"0","recid":"3611","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Observable Actions"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":3},"updated":"2023-07-20T08:28:40.518795+00:00"}