{"created":"2023-05-15T15:30:56.319946+00:00","id":3498,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"ba123193-713d-42c4-9fa9-8e9a2cfe08cc"},"_deposit":{"created_by":17,"id":"3498","owners":[17],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"3498"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003498","sets":["4"]},"author_link":["7445"],"item_1_biblio_info_5":{"attribute_name":"bibliographic_information","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2009-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"2","bibliographicPageEnd":"187","bibliographicPageStart":"175","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"5","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Annals of Finance","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_1_description_18":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper studies a duopolistic credit market in which borrowers differ in risk. In our competition game, one lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. We investigate the features of the equilibrium contract and show that the best borrower is indifferent between the dominant and the opponent lenders’ contract while the other borrowers prefer that of the dominant lender. Also, repayment and collateral do not depend upon the borrowers’ respective project risk.","subitem_description_language":"en","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_1_publisher_6":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Springer","subitem_publisher_language":"en"}]},"item_1_relation_8":{"attribute_name":"item_1_relation_8","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type":"isVersionOf","subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_id_text":"info:doi/10.1007/s10436-008-0104-8","subitem_relation_type_select":"DOI"}}]},"item_1_rights_12":{"attribute_name":"権利表記","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com","subitem_rights_language":"en"}]},"item_1_rights_13":{"attribute_name":"出版社版URI","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"http://www.springerlink.com/content/k74351n403p87748/","subitem_rights_language":"ja"}]},"item_1_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"item_1_source_id_11","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA12248199","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_1_source_id_7":{"attribute_name":"ISSN / EISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"1614-2446","subitem_source_identifier_type":"PISSN"}]},"item_1_subject_16":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"338.1","subitem_subject_language":"ja","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"},{"subitem_subject":"330","subitem_subject_language":"ja","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_1_subject_17":{"attribute_name":"NIIサブジェクト","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"経済学","subitem_subject_language":"ja","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_1_version_type_15":{"attribute_name":"出版タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Kojima, Naoki","creatorNameLang":"en","creatorNameType":"Personal"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"7445","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-01-26"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"credit-contract-final.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"178.3 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"credit-contract-final.pdf","url":"https://barrel.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/3498/files/credit-contract-final.pdf"},"version_id":"45159260-f8a9-4f5d-8c92-6248c409fb67"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Asymmetric information","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Lender borrower relationship","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Type-dependent reservation utility","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Imperfect competition","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Credit contract","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"item_resource_type","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"journal article","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"1","owner":"17","path":["4"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2010-04-06"},"publish_date":"2010-04-06","publish_status":"0","recid":"3498","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets"],"weko_creator_id":"17","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2025-03-17T00:40:06.667991+00:00"}