

A Survey of Ecocritical Thinking from Marxism to Postmodernism

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Ecocritical thinking is witnessed in the literary works of Horace and Homer, but it takes a distinctive form in the English Romantic poetry by John Clare, William Wordsworth, John Keats, etc. Today, several schools of ecocriticism exist, but their arguments have become so diversified that they seem to take on more or less arbitrary nuances. In the following argument, I will investigate various ecocritical thoughts exemplified by leading critics and philosophers, ranging from Karl Marx to Slavoj Žižek, and point out the common features they share, as well as their distinction, which will provide a new perspective for the recurrent topic of the complicated relationship between Nature and human beings.

I commence my discussion by introducing Marx's view on Nature and the environment, in the light of Terry Eagleton's re-evaluation of Marx's philosophy.¹ According to Marx, we cannot find ourselves in Nature under capitalism. In other words, Nature in capitalist economics is only an object of utility. This is not to suggest that we must have complete identification with Nature. Marx himself admits that human beings are partly separated from Nature, though in his early work he dreams of an ultimate unity between them. In his mature years, he recognises that Nature remains obstinately uncooperative: there is always a tension or non-identity between Nature and humanity. In this respect, Marx has some influence on Kate Soper's ecocritical thoughts, as will be discussed later.

Marx believes in boundless human productive forces, but, at the same time, he understands that Nature imposes restrictions on human beings. Capitalism, with its irrational drive for infinite production and capital accumulation, cannot avoid losing ecological balance. Capitalism may care about ecological problems, but it does so especially when the technology of protecting the environment gains profits from them. Capitalists' limitless drive for accumulation will become out of control and devastate the environment, ending in self-destruction. Terry Eagleton observes that Marx would have been a leader of the environmentalist movement if he were alive today (Eagleton, p. 229).

John Ruskin, who is a contemporary of Marx but educated in a puritanical ambience, raises an objection to anthropocentrism. As is generally known, Ruskin advocates 'the pathetic fallacy' to warn human beings of their negative attitude towards the autonomy for Nature. Ruskin takes John Keats's poem *Endymion*, II, 350, as an example of the pathetic fallacy. Keats describes the peculiar action of the sea foam by using such words as 'wayward indolence'. Ruskin, on the other hand, admires Homer's depiction of Nature. For Homer, the wave is nothing other than salt water, and salt water cannot be wayward or indolent. Homer calls the waves 'over-roofed', 'monstrous', 'compact-black', 'dark-clear', and these epithets represent pure physical Nature. It is not that Homer lacks any sympathy and feeling for Nature. According to Ruskin, Homer has a much stronger feeling of faith in the animation of the sea than Keats. Homer avoids falling into anthropocentrism by believing that there is something living in the sea, which he calls a god.²

William Morris admires Ruskin, but Marx's thought forms the basis of his critical stance. Unlike Ruskin, Morris regards religion as representing a hierarchical society, and so he more or less underestimates

religion in general, although he personally engaged in decorating churches in his line of business. From his ecocritical viewpoint, the tyranny of commercial war, together with miraculous machines, ruins the aspect of the countryside in late nineteenth-century England. He argues that the solid grey dwellings scattered about the English fields have been thrust aside by miserable brick and slate at the hands of commercialism. He further insists that no one should be allowed to cut down trees, to befoul rivers, or to degrade earth for mere profit. By the same token, there must be decency of surroundings: good lodging, ample space, order and beauty. Just as Ruskin entitles his economic review *Unto This Last* in which he claims the due wage and normalisation of labour, Morris denounces the capitalist motto 'The devil take the hindmost' that mocks the destitute's every effort to live decent lives in decent surroundings.³

The increase in distinctions and prejudices of a class after the Industrial Revolution is a subject discussed in detail by Ashley Montagu, the English anthropologist:⁴ a hereditary aristocracy moved into business on a large scale, and employers kept labour cheap as long as possible. Poverty and starvation were mistaken for the law of Nature. In this context, Thomas Robert Malthus published, in 1798, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* in which he argues that poverty is unavoidable due to the exponential increase of population as against the increase of the means of subsistence in arithmetic progression. Whether or not this doctrine was true concerning the social conditions of those days, it fitted in with the philosophy of shrewd industrialists, who could now blatantly justify the expropriation and exploitation of their workers. In Malthus's view, Montagu notes, human life is a constant struggle for existence in which the strongest survive and the weaker perish. The term 'the struggle for existence', which stands for the gist of Malthus's thought, was

adopted by Charles Darwin in his *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* published in 1859. Montagu goes on to explain the cases in which the term ‘the struggle for existence’ generated its own momentum: the Malthusian-Darwinian conception of the struggle for life established itself not only among biologists but also among sociologists in the late nineteenth century. Herbert Spencer, the English sociologist, elaborates this conception into Social Darwinism, which is summarised succinctly by his famous phrase ‘the survival of the fittest’. In 1888, the distinguished biologist Thomas Henry Huxley published the ‘Struggle for Existence manifesto’, which states that life is a continuous free fight, and that the Hobbesian war is the normal state of life.

In 1893, two years before his death, Huxley advanced his revised argument, in the Romanes Lecture, that the ruthless self-assertion linked with the cosmic struggle for existence should be replaced by self-restraint based on goodness or virtue. However, this revised argument was never so popular as his ‘Struggle for Existence manifesto’ of five years earlier. Similarly, Darwin published, in 1871, *The Descent of Man*, in which he revises his rather one-sided hypotheses developed in *The Origin of Species*, and puts special emphasis on the principle of cooperation, but this revision falls flat in the face of the so-called tough Darwinians.

Montagu observes that Huxley’s ‘Struggle for Existence manifesto’ was countered by Peter Kropotkin in the form of eight articles published between 1890 and 1896 in the monthly periodical *Nineteenth Century*. It may have been this reply from Kropotkin that caused Huxley to revise his former viewpoint. Kropotkin’s eight articles were later collected and published in book form in 1902 as *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*. From the journeys that he made in his youth in Eastern Siberia and

Northern Manchuria, Kropotkin could not find what most Darwinists, if not Darwin himself, considered the bitter struggle for existence '*among animals belonging to the same species*'.⁵ Since then, he has had serious doubts as to the competition for the means of subsistence within each species, and as to the dominant role this is supposed to play in the evolution of new species.

On the other hand, when he saw mutual aid and mutual support among scores of thousands of intelligent animals which came together and crossed the Amur to fly, he found that mutual aid and mutual support have the greatest importance 'for the maintenance of life, the preservation of each species, and its further evolution' (Kropotkin, p. 2). Furthermore, he decides that 'no progressive evolution of the species' can be based upon the struggle for existence, even though it occurs to the species that suffer from scarcity of food, since they have grown too much exhausted with the ordeal to fight against each other (Kropotkin, p. 3). Consequently, he does not agree with Social Darwinism that recognises that 'the struggle for the means of existence, of every animal against all its congeners, and of every man against all other men' is 'a law of Nature' (Kropotkin, p. 3). Thus, the mutual aid makes a common foundation on which Nature and human beings stand to preserve and evolve each species. Montagu also proposes the principle of cooperation among organisms, which largely follows Kropotkin's key concept.

This is not to say that all life has equal intrinsic value. Marx observes that there is always non-identity between Nature and humanity, as mentioned above. Kate Soper refers to the same effect: 'To get "closer" to nature is, in a sense, to experience more anxiety about all those ways in which we cannot finally identify with it nor it with us'.⁶ She argues that Nature is 'both that which we are not *and* that which we

are within' (Soper, p. 21). The problem with the humanity-nature relationship, she contends, lies in its subject-object antithesis. There is no dividing humanity from Nature nor identifying the one with the other, but there are various degrees of difference between them.

In this context, she differentiates beauties of Nature from the remainder of the elements of Nature. She argues that preserving the beauties of Nature helps to promote its sustainable use, which, in turn, helps to promote the preservation of the beauties of Nature, in a positive feedback mechanism. She goes on to contend that 'what practically serves to enhance the aesthetic attractions of the environment may also advance the conservationist cause' (ibid., p. 253). Hence, she denounces those who insist on equal treatment for all life forms, whether they are mosquitoes, locusts, streptococci, or AIDS viruses. Such treatment, she argues, leads to the absurdity of the dependency of life on the destruction of life (ibid., pp. 257-58).

There is, however, a counterargument to her proposition. According to Jonathan Bate, modern biologists have found that evolution operates not only on the basis of the gene but also at the level of the ecosystem.⁷ As is commonly understood, if we were to exterminate either mosquitoes, locusts, or viruses, the ecosystem, in which almost all life forms coexist in exquisite balance with each other, would be seriously disrupted, and thus our existence itself would be in jeopardy. Jean Baudrillard refers to the same effect with regard to the social structure:

Any structure that hunts down, expels or exorcizes its negative elements risks a catastrophe caused by a thoroughgoing backlash. [...] Anything that purges the accursed share in itself signs its own death warrant. This is the theorem of the accursed share.⁸

Jonathan Bate makes much of unpicturesque, but ecologically important, phenomena, such as peat bogs and earthworms, whilst lamenting over environmental campaigners' difficulties in raising money for the defence of these natural phenomena. However, they easily raise money for the protection of natural phenomena 'that are regarded as beautiful (a clear lake in the mountains, an old-growth forest) or that have anthropomorphic appeal (a cuddly giant panda, a seemingly smiling and linguistically well-endowed dolphin)' (*The Song of the Earth*, p. 138).

He wryly admits that 'environmentalism was begotten by the picturesque, an aesthetic theory', as Kate Soper would definitely affirm (*ibid.*, p. 138). Unlike Kate Soper who describes the locust as unattractive, Jonathan Bate quotes John Keats's sonnet 'The Poetry of Earth', wherein Keats pricks up his attentive ears to catch the songs of the grasshopper and the cricket:

The poetry of earth is never dead:
 When all the birds are faint with the hot sun,
 And hide in cooling trees, a voice will run
 From hedge to hedge about the new-mown mead;
 That is the Grasshopper's—he takes the lead
 In summer luxury,—he has never done
 With his delights; for when tired out with fun
 He rests at ease beneath some pleasant weed.

The poetry of earth is ceasing never:
 On a lone winter evening, when the frost
 Has wrought a silence, from the stove there shrills
 The Cricket's song, in warmth increasing ever,

And seems to one in drowsiness half lost,
The Grasshopper's among some grassy hills.⁹

It is the earth's own poetry, not the aesthetic value of these insects, or of their songs, that Jonathan Bate greatly appreciates. He fears that the song of the earth is drowned not only by the noise of heavy machinery but also by 'the susurrus of cyberspace', and keenly feels our urgent need to retain a place for the song of the earth in culture and human imagination (*The Song of the Earth*, pp. 281-82).

Above all, he bitterly criticises the postmodernists and new historicists who argue that nature is 'nothing more than an anthropomorphic construct' created by human beings 'for their own purposes'.¹⁰ In short, they claim that there is no Nature. Jonathan Bate warns that at a time when we must redress the destruction of Nature caused by our insatiable desire for production and consumption *before* it is too late, it would do more harm than good if we were to say 'There is no Nature' (*ibid.*, p. 56). He designates the specific time when it is too late, that is to say, when there is no Nature: the time when there are more accidents at nuclear power plants than that of Chernobyl (*ibid.*, p. 56). Despite his warning of twenty years earlier, we witnessed another severe accident at Fukushima in 2011.

Jonathan Bate's argument against postmodernists, not least against new historicists, has something in common with Marx's ideas. From the point of view of Marxism, postmodernists repress the natural, material body and dissolve it into culture. They cope with the human body only as a 'cultural construct' (Eagleton, p. 232). Terry Eagleton argues that the postmodernists' detestation of the material world is due to its blockage of the infinite progress of humanity. For postmodernists,

the material world has to be either conquered or dissolved into culture. According to Eagleton, postmodernism and the American dream are 'sides of the same coin' (ibid., p. 233).

Although Slavoj Žižek is a postmodern critic, he appreciates Marx's true value as well as Jacques Lacan's psychoanalysis. He addresses ecological catastrophes in regard to ecocriticism. According to Žižek, Nature, in itself, is chaotic and causes the wildest and most unpredictable catastrophes.¹¹ We must not consider that ecological catastrophes are solvable by means of science and technology, nor spiritualise them as if they were caused by the revenge of Mother Earth for our exploitation of natural resources (*Living in the End Times*, p. 429). What we must do is 'a concrete social analysis of the economical, political and ideological roots of ecological problems' (ibid., p. 429). Capitalism simply turns ecological problems into a new field of investment and tries to solve them by the market's 'invisible hand', but this solution cannot cope with an ecological disaster or a nuclear calamity. Žižek suggests that we should invent new forms of global cooperation and employ large-scale social transformations to deal with such ecological catastrophes instead of relying on the competition of individual egotism which is supposed to function as the common good (ibid., pp. 429–31). What is more, Nature itself brings about internal disturbance of the natural cycle, as Žižek notes (ibid., p. 430).

Apart from the violence of Nature, he points out the fundamental systematic violence of capitalism, which is directed not only against human beings but also against Nature. Here, the violence is not attributable to any individuals but is anonymous and spectral.¹² There is a distinction between the aggression that amounts to a life-force and the violence that is a death drive, in which violence is 'not aggression as such,

but its excess, which disturbs the normal run of things by desiring always more and more' (*Violence*, p. 63). It is this violence that is directed against the natural and human environment, as will be discussed later. Desire is legitimate so far as an individual achieves independence from others, but under the condition of competition, a natural tendency is always to demand much more than is needed. Hence, limitless desire (*ibid.*, p. 63). Capitalism allows human beings to compete with one another with a view to pursuing the goal of profitability such that their desire oversteps its limits. The general aggressiveness that would otherwise become a life-force turns into the violence tinged with a death drive. Žižek quotes Saint Augustine's *Confessions* as a weird example of the death drive created by excessive desire in the competitive ambience: an infant becomes pale and looks at its foster-brother bitterly when the latter is suckling at the mother's breast (*Violence*, p. 87). This argument is based on Lacan's reference to the same passage in *Confessions*.¹³

In the competitive ambience of commercialism, a commodity not only satisfies a need but also promises 'something more', 'an unfathomable enjoyment'.¹⁴ Lacan calls this unfathomable enjoyment 'a surplus enjoyment (*plus-de-jouir*)', which is inspired by Marx's concept of surplus value.¹⁵ According to Lacan, a surplus enjoyment is 'the excess of *jouissance* which has no "use value", but persists for the mere sake of enjoyment' (Evans, p. 125). Žižek illustrates these cases succinctly:

'If you eat our chocolate, you will not just eat chocolate, but also [...] have a (totally useless) plastic toy'.[...] ('Buy a DVD player and get five DVDs for free') [...]: the function of this 'more' is to fill in the lack of a 'less', to compensate for the fact that, by definition, a product never delivers on its (fantasmatic) promise. (*The Puppet and*

the Dwarf, pp. 145–46)

Lacan distinguishes between pleasure and *jouissance*. When he uses the word ‘pleasure’, he refers to the pleasure principle that was posited by Sigmund Freud. Un-pleasure, which is often misunderstood, is related to an excessive quality of enjoyment, that is, *jouissance*, whereas pleasure is related to the reduction of this *jouissance* (Evans, p. 148).

The pleasure principle functions as a limit to enjoyment, and commands the subject to enjoy as little as possible, while the subject attempts to transgress the prohibitions, to go beyond the pleasure principle towards excessive enjoyment, or *jouissance* (Evans, pp. 91–92). Dylan Evans explains why this *jouissance* is related to the death drive:

[T]he result of transgressing the pleasure principle is not more pleasure, but pain, since there is only a certain amount of pleasure that the subject can bear. Beyond this limit, pleasure becomes pain, and this ‘painful pleasure’ is what Lacan calls *jouissance*; ‘*jouissance* is suffering’.[...] The DEATH DRIVE is the name given to that constant desire in the subject to break through the pleasure principle [...]. (Evans, p. 92)

For Freud, the death drive represents the fundamental tendency of every living thing to return to an inorganic state. Lacan also links the death drive to the suicidal tendency of narcissism. Lacan describes the death drive as a desire for the preoedipal fusion with the mother’s breast in search of *jouissance* that is prohibited by the incest taboo. By linking the death drive with the preoedipal phase and with narcissism, Lacan regards the death drive as intrinsic to the mirror stage (Evans, p. 32).

According to Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, a child of six to eighteen months has a narcissistic dual relationship with his or her mirror image as well as the mother figure, before the father figure intervenes between the child and the mother figure.¹⁶ Even when there is no mirror, Lacan notes, the subject sees its behaviour reflected in the gesture of others. It projects the image of its body 'onto all other objects' in the world around it (Evans, p. 190). In other words, it finds its image not only in the mirror but also in its natural and human environment. It should be added that the mirror stage is not a one-off phenomenon in the specific developmental period of the infant. It characterises every dual relationship we have with others, not least competitive relationships.¹⁷ At the mirror stage, the infant finds its self-image in others, and forms a narcissistic dual relationship with them.

The dangerous aspect of this stage consists in the fact that the self-image is unstable and tends to regress to the fragmented body (Evans, p. 115). The competitive relationship with others produces hatred, aggressiveness, and violence when the subject sees its fragmented body reflected in others, that is, in its natural and human environment, as if in a mirror.¹⁸ This is why the subject is driven to mutilate, destroy, and sacrifice its environment.¹⁹ On the other hand, destroying others in the competitive dual relationship makes the subject feel like being destroyed, since both of them reflect each other. Lacan refers to this aggressiveness, and the consequent feeling of self-destruction at the mirror stage, as 'narcissistic suicidal aggression (*l'agression suicidaire narcissique*)' (*Écrits*, p. 187, Evans, p. 120). However, he argues that 'every drive is virtually a death drive', because every drive pursues its own extinction, and every drive is an attempt to go beyond the pleasure principle, to the domain of *jouissance* where enjoyment is experienced as suffering (Evans, p. 33).

Meanwhile, Kant asserts the ethics of proper distance in avoiding the temptation to 'go right to the end'. For Kant, 'law' is the limitation that the subject imposes on itself to stop before the abyss.²⁰ Following this Kantian point of view, Lacan's ethics enjoins us to stop short of the lethal *jouissance* (*The Plague of Fantasies*, p. 309).

If we were to be captured by *jouissance*, we would have to extricate ourselves from it as soon as possible. If we intend to destroy and sacrifice our environment in order to gain ever more profits, we will surely suffer from the painful pleasure or *jouissance* that portends our self-destruction. No one can make profit at the expense of the environment, and be exempt from suffering.

Thus, the mutual aid and mutual support advocated by Kropotkin, or the principle of cooperation proposed by Ashley Montagu, for example, will help to keep us from trespassing on the prohibited realm of painful pleasure and self-destruction. Even in the behaviours of children that Lacan refers to as a case of suicidal aggression, we can find the incipient forms of sympathy and compassion that are essential to the structures of society:

During the whole of this period, one will record the emotional reactions and the articulated evidences of a normal transitivity. The child who strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries.²¹

As discussed, the suicidal tendency of narcissism has relevance to the death drive: an incestuous desire to fulfil the limitless, and thus painful, pleasure of the fusion with the forbidden object, the mother figure (Evans, pp. 32, 205). The symbolic world, which comprises social structure, the

networks of language and culture, and even the networks of Nature,²² is acquired by the intervention of the father figure, or a third term, who prevents the closed dual relationship between the subject and the mother figure.

By the intervention of a third term at the Oedipus phase, the subject's desire for the mother figure is displaced, metaphorically and metonymically, by a series of signifiers.²³ Thus the symbolic order is co-constituted by both the desire for the mother figure, or the death drive that goes beyond the pleasure principle, and the pleasure principle that regulates the subject's limitless and painful pleasure (Evans, p. 202). The death drive is, therefore, the essential constituent of the symbolic order. The death drive not only leads us to the 'narcissistic suicidal aggression' but also prepares for us the foundation on which to create the symbolic order, so long as we can alter, or at least keep a certain distance from, any social and economic system that tempts us to seek after limitless and painful pleasure right to the end.

NOTES

- 1 Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 226–37.
- 2 John Ruskin, 'Of Classical Landscape', *Modern Painters, Volume III* (London: George Allen, 1904), pp. 178–201 (pp. 178–79). See also *The Green Studies Reader: From Romanticism to Ecocriticism*, ed. Laurence Coupe (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 26–29.
- 3 William Morris, 'Art and Socialism', *William Morris: Stories in Prose, Stories in Verse, Shorter Poems, Lectures and Essays* (Centenary Edition), ed. G. D. H. Cole (1934; repr. London: Nonesuch Press, 1948), pp. 624–45 (pp. 636–41). See also William Morris, 'Art and Socialism', *Political Writings of William Morris*, ed. A. L. Morton (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1984), pp. 109–33 (pp. 123–29), as well as *The Green Studies Reader*, pp. 32–36.
- 4 Ashley Montagu, "'The Survival of the Fittest'", *On Being Human* (1950;

- repr. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1966), pp. 15–26 (pp. 15–25).
- 5 Peter Kropotkin, 'Introduction', *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (1902; repr. London: William Heinemann, 1915), pp. 1–10 (p. 1).
 - 6 Kate Soper, *What is Nature?: Culture, Politics and the non-Human* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 278.
 - 7 Jonathan Bate, *The Song of the Earth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 229.
 - 8 Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, trans. James Benedict (1990; repr. London and New York: Verso, 1996), p. 106.
 - 9 F. T. Palgrave, *The Golden Treasury of the Best Songs and Lyrical Poems*, ed. Oscar Williams (1953; repr. New York: Mentor Book, 1961), p. 259.
 - 10 Jonathan Bate, *Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the Environmental Tradition* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 56. See also *The Green Studies Reader*, p. 171.
 - 11 Slavoj Žižek, *Living in the End Times* (London and New York: Verso, 2011), p. 427.
 - 12 Slavoj Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (New York: Picador, 2008), p. 13.
 - 13 Lacan quotes Saint Augustine's *Confessions* as follows: "Vidi ego et expertus sum zelantem parvulum: nondum loquebatur et intuebatur pallidus amaro aspectu conlactaneum suum" (I have seen with my own eyes and known very well an infant in the grip of jealousy: he could not yet speak, and already he observed his foster-brother, pale and with an envenomed stare). See Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: a selection* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 22. See also Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 28: 'I have myself seen jealousy in a baby and know what it means. He was not old enough to talk, but whenever he saw his foster-brother at the breast, he would grow pale with envy. This much is common knowledge. Mothers and nurses say that they can work such things out of the system by one means or another, but surely it cannot be called innocence, when the milk flows in such abundance from its source, to object to a rival desperately in need and depending for his life on this one form of nourishment? Such faults are not small or unimportant, but we are tender-hearted and bear with them because we know that the child will grow out of them. It is clear that they are not mere peccadilloes, because the same faults are intolerable in older persons'.
 - 14 Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2003), p. 145.
 - 15 Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 125.
 - 16 Jacques Lacan, *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 93–100, 277–78.
 - 17 Jacques Lacan, 'Introduction', *Le Séminaire Livre IV: La relation d'objet*

- 1956-1957 (Paris: Seuil, 1994), pp. 11-24 (p. 17).
- 18 Joël Dor, *Introduction à la Lecture de Lacan* (Paris: Denoël, 1985), p. 99.
 - 19 Philippe Julien, *Le retour à Freud de Jacques Lacan: L'application au miroir* (Paris: E.P.E.L., 1990), pp. 50-56.
 - 20 Slavoj Žižek, *The Plague of Fantasies* (1997; repr. London and New York: Verso, 2008), pp. 308-309.
 - 21 See Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: a selection*, p. 21. Regarding the 'suicidal aggression' in this context, Richard Boothby notes: 'On the level of infantile transitivity, murder and suicide amount to the same thing'. See Richard Boothby, *Freud as Philosopher* (New York and London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 152-53.
 - 22 SueEllen Campbell, 'The Land and Language of Desire: Where Deep Ecology and Post-Structuralism Meet', *Western American Literature*, 24 (1989), 199-211 (p. 211).
 - 23 Anika Lemaire, *Jacques Lacan*, trans. David Macey (1977; repr. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 87-88.