

An Ecocritical Paradox: The Unrepresentable within Nature

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Current ecocriticism concerns the un-symbolic elements in our human and nonhuman environments. The un-symbolised and unthinkable nature is all the more significant for its being shorn of metaphoric or figurative expression.¹ Since representation or metaphorisation is nothing less than human control over others, it might be better to keep them unnameable. However, the radioactive particles released from the Chernobyl explosion and the prion protein, the agent of BSE infection, are invisible and almost unrepresentable. They are ubiquitous and all-penetrating substances.² Unless we try to represent or symbolise them as clearly as possible, we will fall into the very ecological crisis that we have tried to prevent by leaving the un-symbolic elements as they stand. This is a profound paradox in current ecocriticism.

In the following argument, I focus on the un-symbolic elements in nature, and conclude that, while the un-symbolised gap within nature is ineluctable, it is of consequence that we reconsider the relationship between the residual of symbolised nature and the symbol-dissolving elements of human nature projected upon the universe.

The un-symbolic elements are originally detected in the symbolic system. Human beings inhabit the world of the symbolic system in which infinitely differentiated and diversified signifiers create a signifying chain, and yet always suffer from the un-symbolic surplus.³ Since the human symbolic system is always threatened by the un-symbolic elements, it is impossible to symbolise perfectly the constituents of the ecosystem. However, various schools of thought from the mid-1970s—formalism, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, new historicism, as well as Marxism—regard nature as existing precisely within the limit of the discourse of ‘culture’.⁴ According to Laurence Coupe, these schools treat nature as a mere code organised into the signifying system of culture, and declare that nature itself does not exist. This is why, he argues, nature, such as a mountain or river, has already become anthropocentric before it has any communicative value. Neil Evernden, on the other hand, puts emphasis on the significance of nature freed of symbolic meaning, and suggests that ‘all metaphoric or figurative content’ should be dismissed from nature if we are to discover its true form, that is, a nameless object, or an ‘essential core of otherness’ (Evernden, p. 121). However, this idea is not always tenable. Should we think highly of the ‘essential core of otherness’ in nature, all life, including the streptococcus or the AIDS virus, would have equal intrinsic value in the ecosystem.⁵ As discussed above, the nameless and unrepresentable nature, such as the radioactive particle or the prion protein, leads to the destruction of the ecosystem.

Thus, the un-symbolic or unrepresentable nature is beyond our value judgement. Slavoj Žižek, one of the postmodern theorists, argues that human beings are obliged to ‘accept their fissured condition’, such that the idea of a ‘total socialization of nature’ is an illusion, since they cut their umbilical cords with nature and cannot regain the lost balance.⁶

Theodor Adorno also refers to the object's 'irreducible otherness', and argues that it is not possible to achieve reconciliation between subject and object at the expense of the object (Zimmerman, p. 161). Adorno insists that nature involves an element 'that cannot be assimilated to scientific rationality or any other social category' (ibid., p. 161).

This 'irreducible otherness' or unrepresentable nature is a far-reaching concept. What Rudolf Otto meant by the Holy is, according to Peter Reed, the late Norwegian ecologist, the 'towering reality' of nature, which differs from us and has its intrinsic value. It is the intrinsic value of nature, not identification but difference, Reed argues, that inspires our awe and respect toward this Other.⁷ Donna Haraway, on the other hand, contends that we must approach nature as Trickster since nature is the result of co-production by humans and nonhumans.⁸ Kate Soper refers to the same effect: 'We have thought, that is, of humanity as being a component of nature even as we have conceptualized nature as absolute otherness to humanity. "Nature" is in this sense both that which we are not *and* that which we are within' (Kate Soper, p. 21). She argues that to insist on 'essential separation from Nature' is 'to sever us too radically from the material context of existence' (ibid., p. 49). In her opinion, our dependence on nature necessitates our detachment from it, since we cannot eventually identify with nature or nature with us. However, she insists that in the process of identifying with nature, we transform 'our sense of human identity' (ibid., p. 278). Donna Haraway and Kate Soper argue against the humanity-nature dichotomy or against a subject-object antithesis, but both of them seem to admit that the residual is always left behind when we seek to identify with nature.

Poets and novelists are also interested in this residual, or the un-symbolic part of nature. According to Aaron Dunckel, the final lines

of Percy Bysshe Shelley's 'Mont Blanc' delineate Mont Blanc's 'vacancy'.⁹ He cites three lines from this poem:

And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea,
If to the human mind's imaginings
Silence and solitude were vacancy?

Traditional interpretation of these lines refers to 'silence and solitude' not as 'vacancy' but as 'the mountain's sublimity and the poet's imaginative power over it' (ibid., p. 209). These interpretations regard 'vacancy' or the un-symbolic void as sublime. If this 'vacancy' means the intrinsic value of nature and the 'irreducible otherness', Mont Blanc's sublimity is on about the same level as the Holy, by which Rudolf Otto means 'towering reality' of nature. Since the Holy, or sublimity, is produced by our imaginative power, we are able to fill the un-symbolic void temporarily with our various sentiments. This is not to say, however, that we can symbolise or represent the 'vacancy' or the 'irreducible otherness'. What we believe to be a perfect representation turns out to be 'virtual' (ibid., p. 212). Dunckel uses what Lacan and Žižek call 'the real' as a tool for elucidating Shelley's 'vacancy' (ibid., pp. 217-18). Dylan Evans resumes this Lacanian concept of the real: 'The real [...] is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order, and impossible to attain in any way' (Evans, p. 160). This real is 'outside language and inassimilable to symbolisation' (ibid., p. 159). Its absolute resistance to symbolisation is indicated by the vacancy or the void within the symbolic world.

For some ecocritics, there is no separability between the environment and the human being, but Shelley recognises 'a pure otherness' or 'the purely external aspects of the environment' (Dunckel, p. 221). A

poem like 'Mont Blanc', Dunckel concludes, helps us to affirm that we are part of and yet separate from Nature (ibid., p. 222). Shelley, while fantasising Mont Blanc as sublime or even as a god, wonders what it would be without 'fantastic projection' (ibid., pp. 221–22).

Thomas Hardy also considers the real in his depiction of nature. Some characters in the novels of Hardy observe nature in itself or its pure otherness, while others impose their individual fantasy upon nature to the point of pathetic fallacy. Those who confront themselves with the real do not fantasise it as holy or sublime but simply fear it. John South in *The Woodlanders* has an indescribable fear toward an elm tree in front of his house:

I could bear up, I know I could, if it were not for the tree—yes, the tree 'tis that's killing me. There he stands, threatening my life every minute that the wind do blow. He'll come down upon us, and squat us dead [...].¹⁰

The same fear is found in the feeling of Mrs Yeobright and Eustacia Vye in *The Return of the Native*. The earth of Egdon Heath is for Mrs Yeobright 'the earthly ball to which she was pinioned', and for Eustacia 'saturnine'.¹¹ Mrs Yeobright wishes to fly away from there like a heron (p. 351), whereas Eustacia assumes an utterly defiant attitude toward Egdon Heath and obstinately detests it (p. 307). However, Yeobright is killed by the venom fangs of an adder hidden in the earth (pp. 358–68), and Eustacia suffers mysterious death from falling into the weir opened in the dark wilderness (p. 436).

On the other hand, Gabriel Oak in *Far from the Madding Crowd* believes in the earth goddess, and replaces the vacancy of the earth with

her sublimity,¹² while Tess Durbeyfield in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and Sue Bridehead, as well as Jude Fawley, in *Jude the Obscure* pathetically concern themselves in nature. Tess has an excessive empathy for wounded pheasants by dealing them the *coup de grâce* after she has been thrown into an extremely miserable condition by the encounter with a vindictive rustic who was once knocked down by Angel Clare.¹³ Jude shows an extraordinary sympathy for rooks and earthworms, while Sue falls into a pathetic fallacy when she dotes upon roses.¹⁴

Yet, Giles Winterborne, in *The Woodlanders*, contemplates the vacancy of nature itself, instead of colouring it with fear, hatred, sublimity, or with empathy. He tries to represent the multifaceted complexity of trees by keeping a relationship neither too close to nor too remote from them. He hears the sap flowing through the veins of leaves and, at the same time, observes that 'the ivy slowly strangle[s] to death the promising sapling' (*The Woodlanders*, p. 93). He neither apotheosises nature nor emotionalises its pure otherness, but endeavours to represent the real to the best of his ability.

Iris Murdoch's depiction of nature is characterised by its close relationship with the protagonist's consciousness. Indescribably complex feelings or thoughts are represented by various shades of landscapes. The fact that the author utilises nature to represent subtle human feelings or thoughts seems to imply that nature is perfectly caught up in the network of the signification of language. The following patterns of Murdoch's typical depiction of nature parallel the developmental stages of the characters' consciousness:

- (1) With the kaleidoscopic changes of 'light', the elements of water— fog, mist, rain, snow, and the like—compete or mingle, and make a vision-

ary scene. On the other hand, this same ‘water’ shows its weird phases together with other uncanny objects.

- (2) The weird phases of water emerge. The ‘light’ is extinguished, and darkness prevails. The ‘water’ and ‘darkness’ dominate over the landscapes.
- (3) The ‘light’ appears again in the foreground, and ordinary hues suddenly become fresh and vivid.
- (4) The world shines with brilliant lights, or darkens again with water, but in any case there appears a solid image.¹⁵

In *The Bell*, for example, the following scene, where Dora and Toby playfully pull up a legendary bell from the bottom of the lake, shows the complication of moonlight and water in creating a fantastic atmosphere. This reflects Dora’s temporal fantasy and, at the same time, the adjectives, such as ‘brittle’ and ‘motionless’, imply the bottomless depth of her anxiety as well as of the lake:

The sedge warbler sang again, a little farther off. The lake was brittle and motionless, the reeds and grasses moving very slightly in the warm breeze, the moon as bright as it could be.¹⁶

When Dora tries to rescue Catherine, who has thrown herself into the water, Dora is, herself, dragged into the mud. The ‘brittle’ and ‘motionless’ lake has revealed itself and turned into a ‘bottomless morass’, which is pulling human beings into an abyss of death. The world is filled with water and darkness:

Her feet trampled vainly in a bottomless morass of watery mud and weed.[...] Water streamed into her gasping mouth and the weeds now held one arm pinioned beneath the surface. Her feet trampled deeper in the gluey mud. She uttered a moaning cry of despair. A black tunnel seemed to open below her into which she was slowly being drawn. (p. 278)

At the critical moment of her drowning, the water is the void into which she is being dragged. It refuses any symbolisation and, as an 'irreducible otherness', refuses to be caught within the boundary of the symbolic system. After Dora and Catherine have been rescued, Dora gazes at the following landscape:

Great sheets of various coloured cloud trailed endlessly across the sky, and the sun blazed intermittently upon the thick masses of yellow and copper trees. (p. 299)

Dora's experience of facing death and of escaping from it by a hair's breadth causes the sense of defamiliarisation in her mind. Ordinary colours and landscapes are presented to her mind in an unusual aspect. Her quasi-religious revelation after a narrow escape is symbolised by the revived nature.

In the last scene, Dora is depicted rowing a boat over the surface of the water. The mist is replaced by sunshine. The solidity of the boat sliding on the water represents Dora's inner stability:

The oars dipped and the boat moved away slowly over the surface of the water.[...] The mist was becoming golden. Now it began to clear away [...]. Behind the Court the clouds were in perpetual motion, but the sky was clear at the zenith and the sunshine began to warm her. She kicked off her sandals and trailed one foot in the water over the edge of the boat. The depths below affrighted her no longer. (p. 316)

Here, the water is depicted as independent of any emotion: it is neither romantic nor fearful. The water is observed by her objectivising eyes, and represented at a given distance from it. She gains a certain control over the water or 'the otherness', although what is out of her control is always left behind as a residual, which is the void under the surface of the water.

The apparent control of water, despite its uncontrollableness, is also witnessed in the last scene of *The Unicorn*. Effingham unwittingly steps into a dangerous bottomless bog, and gets into a hopeless situation when he finds himself submerging:

The dark bog seemed empty now, utterly empty [...]. He could still feel himself slowly sinking. He could not envisage what was to come.[...] As if obeying some imperative, a larger imperative that he had ever acknowledged before, he collected himself and concentrated his attention; yet what he was concentrating on was blackness too, a very dark central blackness'.¹⁷

As in the case of Dora, the water is beyond Effingham's control. He is confronted with the void of darkness that absolutely resists symbolisation

and is thus outside the symbolic world. In this sense, 'a very dark central blackness' is the real. When he is miraculously rescued by Denis Nolan and gets out of the bog, he utters spontaneously: 'How beautiful the bog looks in the sun. So many colours, reds and blues and yellows. I never knew it had so many colours [...]' (ibid., p. 170). He seems to symbolise the bog perfectly as if he had succeeded in controlling the water. Here, too, the protagonist experiences the sense of defamiliarisation. He has a quasi-religious revelation after the narrow escape from death just as Dora does. In the last scene of *The Unicorn*, the rainwater is shielded by the train which Effingham takes to go back to his ordinary life, as if he had completely forgotten his experience at the bog, while the drifting rain and the treeless land are never subjected to the symbolic world of human life (pp. 269-70). This scene vividly represents the interface between nature and human beings.

The last scene of *Henry and Cato* shows the same kind of interface between them:

It was raining hard outside. Cato set off, watching out for taxis. The crucifix, in its case, heavy and awkward inside his mackintosh pocket, banged irregularly against his thigh at each step.¹⁸

The ivory crucifix, the symbolic element, is enshrined in Cato's mackintosh pocket and safely sheltered from the heavy rain, which is, however, not controlled by the symbolic power of the crucifix.

William Golding is also interested in the un-symbolic element of nature. Although he seems to believe in Mother Gaia, this earth goddess has a symbol-dissolving force, and, as such, has the character of a devil as well as a goddess. He implies that the earth is 'a conscious female

organism', and 'wrecks cities with earthquakes and volcanoes' when she is irritated.¹⁹ Golding invented the idea of 'Gaia' in the mid-1960s, when he frequently met Professor James Lovelock, propounder of the Gaia hypothesis. Actually, it was Golding who suggested Lovelock call his theory 'Gaia' instead of 'Gyre', and the professor adopted Golding's suggestion (*ibid.*, pp. 290–91). According to Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis, life on the surface of the earth 'has been regulating the composition of the atmosphere ever since life formed on earth', and life 'would make the climate, because the climate depends on the atmosphere' (*ibid.*, p. 291).

On the other hand, Golding develops his own idea of Gaia and suggests:

'[T]he electrical discharges in the clouds, which we call lightning, are also signs of a consciousness. A mind may be "staring out at us from the unimaginable violence of the sun", and as our science improves we may be able at last to see our mother, Gaia'. (*ibid.*, p. 411)

Conversely, however, Golding later proposes that 'the universe, far from being a conscious organism, may be a figment created out of our own souls' (*ibid.*, p. 411). The author regards black holes in outer space as those which human beings invent when confronted with the unimaginable or the indescribable gaps in history, such as the atrocities of the Second World War. He goes so far as to argue that we create not only history but our own universe.²⁰ In this sense, Golding's view of nature cannot but be anthropocentric. However, the inadequacy of our ability to symbolise does not allow us to assume an anthropocentric attitude toward nature, which is beyond symbolisation or description. Not that there is any

symbol-dissolving force found in nature. It is innate in our mind, and sometimes projected upon the screen of the universe. Thus, Golding's anthropocentrism eventually illustrates the poverty of a human being's symbolic system.

In *Lord of the Flies*, the law and rules observed by the boys on an uninhabited island are apparently disrupted by the lord of the flies, or the prince of devils, incarnated in a sow's head skewered on a stick and swarming with flies, but actually the lord of the flies is the projection on nature of the symbol-dissolving force generated in the boys' mind at once by excruciating the maternal and by being fascinated with her. As a matter of fact, the conch, the representative of the symbolic system, is pulverised not by the force of nature but by Roger, one of the demented hunters, who rolls down a gigantic rock at Piggy standing with the conch on the cliff.²¹ From what we deduce from various scenes of this fiction, the symbol-dissolving force is derived from the aggressiveness toward the mother figure; the hunters' desire to outrage the mother pig. It is certain that human beings are alienated from the total socialisation of nature due to the severance of the umbilical cord. However, they are endowed with the ability to symbolise in place of the severance. It is by means of this ability that we learn something about the ecosystem of which we are a part. As is well known, we acquire the symbolic system by the intervention of the father figure whose function it is to disrupt the closed dual relationship between the subject and the mother figure. Without the father figure's intervention, the subject's close relationship with the mother figure would take on erotic aggressiveness.²² The universe is, for Golding, the screen on which to cast these psychological processes. As the differentiation and diversity of the symbolic gives way to aggressiveness, the ecosystem and biodiversity of the universe gradually collapses.

Since human beings are inextricably organised into the ecosystem, the boys destroy themselves by destroying the ecosystem of the universe.

In *The Inheritors*, too, human psychology is projected on the natural phenomena of the universe, which are supposed to be ruled by Oa, Mother Gaia. The Neanderthals' symbolic system is stable on account of their harmonious relationship with the maternal represented by the old woman. Even though Mal, the father figure, is debilitated and senile, the old woman, who is his wife, acknowledges his status and holds him in respect even after his death. Mal is qualified to play the role of the father figure who intervenes in the dual relationship between the old woman and her children. The new people, by contrast, are not harmoniously organised, since Marlan, who assumes a patriarchal dictatorship and has a lascivious affair with Vivani, is not regarded as a father figure. Lacking the intervening father figure, Tuami is bewitched by Vivani, engaged in making sadomasochistic love with her, and harbours a murderous intent toward Marlan.²³ Thus, the new people's symbolic system starts to collapse. They disrupt the environment, both human and nonhuman, in order to find an objective correlative of the disruption of their symbolic system. Oa, the earth goddess, is also disrupted, as is implied in the new people's shout 'A-ho! A-ho! A-ho!', which shows the disruption of the two phonemes 'O' and 'A' (*The Inheritors*, pp. 191-92). The old woman, the incarnation of Oa, is murdered by the new people. Liku, Lok's daughter, who always carries an Oa doll with her, is burnt alive and devoured by them. Finally, the new people undergo near-disaster when their habitat suffers flood caused by the water from the ice on the mountains.

The universe depicted in *Pincher Martin* is, most of all, a figment of Christopher Martin's hallucination. The objective correlative of the

collapse of his symbolic system is found in the crumbling down of a dwarf made of rocks, his fragmented body reflected in the surface of the water, as well as in the fragment of the sea and the island depicted in the last scene. Nathaniel Walterson, a man of religion, intervenes in the relationship between Martin and Mary Lovell, and abruptly gets engaged to her. Nathaniel's role may appear to be that of the father figure, but his liaison with Mary is, as Martin suggests, anything but refined and lacking in the dignity of a pious believer.²⁴ This lack of the father figure has caused Martin's insatiable lust for her, thus disrupting his symbolic system.

The same psychological process is observed in the mind of Dean Jocelin in *The Spire*. The pit, on which the spire is to be constructed, is where Dia Mater, 'the Greek moon-goddess of the oak-cult', lives.²⁵ It moves, vibrates and disturbs the earth, so that the spire—the culmination of the symbolic system of the cathedral—becomes extremely unstable. However, this symbol-dissolving force neither pertains to nature nor to Dia Mater. It is derived from the disturbance of Dean Jocelin's symbolic system. Here, also, is a projection of the protagonist's psychological phenomena upon nature. Jocelin always feels a private lust for Goody Pangall, his beloved follower, but the realisation is strictly prohibited due to his status as Dean. During the progress of the construction of the spire, Jocelin unexpectedly witnesses Goody and Roger, the master builder, illicitly creating a consummation of love, with the result that she becomes pregnant. In terms of his excellent building skill and virility, the master builder may have the role of the father figure that intervenes between Jocelin and Goody, but Roger ceases to be a father figure for Jocelin owing to his fast and furtive ways to acquire Goody.²⁶ Thus, Jocelin's increasing and uncontrollable lust for Goody undermines his symbolic system as well as his health.

So far as Golding's four novels mentioned above are concerned, what seems to be a perfect control of nature by humans ironically proves the fact that the symbol-dissolving elements, as opposed to the ability to symbolise, are also latent in our minds. When human beings become eager to search the universe for the objective correlative of the symbol-dissolving force, the crisis of environmental destruction will increase.

Jonathan Bate argues that the unrepresentable is by definition 'the thing-in-itself (Kant's *Ding an sich*)'.²⁷ Evans also notes that the real is, 'like the Kantian thing-in-itself, an unknowable *x*' (Evans, p. 161). However, the real is not only philosophical but psychological. Lacan's 'the Thing (*das Ding*)' is, Evans argues, 'the forbidden object of incestuous desire, the mother', and thus the subject is obliged to 'circle round it without ever attaining it' (Evans, p. 205). Alain Juranville distinguishes between Kant's *Ding an sich* and Lacan's *das Ding*. Kant's *Ding an sich* is only unrecognisable or unknowable, while Lacan's 'real' or 'the Thing (*das Ding*)' is the signifier whose plenitude is impossible.²⁸ For Shelley, the real is so far away from him that it remains philosophical. The protagonists of Murdoch's fiction come up against the real, but finally succeed in circling round it, as some characters in Hardy's novels fail. In Golding's fiction, characters are often trapped by the real—'the forbidden object of incestuous desire'—and affected by its symbol-dissolving force.

NOTES

- 1 Neil Evernden, *The Social Creation of Nature* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 70-71.
- 2 Richard Kerridge, 'Introduction', in *Writing the Environment: Ecocriticism and Literature*, ed. by Richard Kerridge and Neil Sammells (London: Zed Books, 1998), pp. 1-9.
- 3 Dylan Evans argues that 'one signifier attempts to represent the subject for all other signifiers, but inevitably a surplus is always produced'. See Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 125.
- 4 Laurence Coupe, 'General Introduction', in *The Green Studies Reader: From Romanticism to Ecocriticism*, ed. by Laurence Coupe (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 2.
- 5 Kate Soper, *What is Nature?* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 257.
- 6 Michael E. Zimmerman, *Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 213. See also Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1990), p. 5.
- 7 Zimmerman, p. 303. See also Peter Reed, 'Man Apart: An Alternative to the Self-Realization Approach', *Environmental Ethics*, 11 (1989), 53-70.
- 8 Zimmerman, pp. 364-65. See also Donna Haraway, 'The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others', in *Cultural Studies*, ed. by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 295-337.
- 9 Aaron Dunckel, "'Mont Blanc": Shelley's Sublime Allegory of the Real', in *The Greening of Literary Scholarship: Literature, Theory, and the Environment*, ed. by Steven Rosendale (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2002), pp. 207-23.
- 10 Thomas Hardy, *The Woodlanders* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 138.
- 11 Thomas Hardy, *The Return of the Native* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), pp. 123, 351.
- 12 Thomas Hardy, *Far from the Madding Crowd* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 300.
- 13 Thomas Hardy, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (1978; repr. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), pp. 352-53.
- 14 Thomas Hardy, *Jude the Obscure* (1978; repr. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), pp. 53-55, 365-66.
- 15 Yasunori Sugimura, 'The Effects of Murdoch's Nature Depiction', *Studies in English Literature English Number 1983* (1983), 255-57.
- 16 Iris Murdoch, *The Bell* (St. Albans: Panther Books, 1976), p. 216.
- 17 Iris Murdoch, *The Unicorn* (St. Albans: Panther Books, 1977), pp. 166-67.
- 18 Iris Murdoch, *Henry and Cato* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 400.
- 19 John Carey, *William Golding: The Man Who Wrote Lord of the Flies*

- (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), p. 411.
- 20 John Carey, pp. 411–12. See also William Golding, ‘Crabbed Youth and Age’, in *A Moving Target* (1982; repr. London: Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 103: ‘Did we discover black holes out there in space because we had already invented them in here? Do we create not only our history but our universe?’
- 21 William Golding, *Lord of the Flies* (1954; repr. London: Faber and Faber, 2005), p. 193.
- 22 According to Dylan Evans, ‘Lacan situates aggressivity in the dual relation between the ego and the counterpart’. Evans argues that this aggressivity is ‘erotic aggression’, meaning both eroticism and aggression. See Evans, p. 6. See also Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: a selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (1977; repr. London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 18–21. According to Melanie Klein, the union between the infant and the mother is not necessarily full of bliss. The infant sometimes harbours brutal aggressiveness toward the mother, lost in wild fancies of mangling her body while suffering from the delusion of being persecuted by her. See Melanie Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945* (London: Virago, 1991), pp. 308–09.
- 23 See William Golding, *The Inheritors* (1955; repr. London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 226: ‘What a fool Marlan was, at his age, to have run off with her for her great heart and wit, her laughter and her white, incredible body! And what fools we were to come with him, forced by his magic, or at any rate forced by some compulsion there are no words for!’
- 24 Flashbacks in Martin’s mind imply the broadness of Nathaniel’s liaison with Mary and its impact on Martin: ‘There must be acres of the stuff spread on the child-time rocks at Tresellyn. That was where Nat had taken her—taken her in two senses, grateful for the tip.[...] Christ, how I hate you. I could eat you. Because you fathomed her mystery, you have a right to handle her transmuted cheap tweed; because you both have made a place where I can’t get; because in your fool innocence you’ve got what I had to get or go mad’. See William Golding, *Pincher Martin* (1956; repr. London: Faber and Faber, 1988), pp. 100–01.
- 25 Rosemary Sumner, *The Spire by William Golding* (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1986), p. 67.
- 26 William Golding, *The Spire* (1964; repr. London: Faber and Faber, 1988), p. 125.
- 27 Jonathan Bate, *The Song of the Earth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 247.
- 28 Alain Juranville, *Lacan et la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984), pp. 100, 216.