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The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4259
http://hdl.handle.net/10252/42599bafdb68-0786-44a7-8bfc-15a85428cad8
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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DP_74.PDF (961.7 kB)
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Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2010-07-12 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | The Weak Core of Simple Games with Ordinal Preferences : Implementation in Nash Equilibrium | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
著者 |
Shinotsuka, Tomoichi
× Shinotsuka, Tomoichi× Takamiya, Koji |
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著者別名 | ||||||
姓名 | 篠塚, 友一 | |||||
著者別名 | ||||||
姓名 | 高宮, 浩司 | |||||
書誌情報 |
Discussion paper series 巻 74, p. 1-18, 発行日 2001-10 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 小樽商科大学ビジネス創造センター | |||||
テキストバージョン | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
日本十進分類法 | ||||||
主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
主題 | 331.19 | |||||
NIIサブジェクト | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | 経済学 | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are "absolutely powerful" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power. We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination, and Exclusion. |